

# Appendix for "Expectations"

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## A Appendix for Survey Experiment

In the following, I present additional analyses of my survey and present the survey in itself.

### A.1 Online Questionnaire and Ethics

A translated version of the full survey questionnaire is found in the end of this appendix, in section D. The survey can be previewed via the following link: [https://copensocialscience.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/preview/previewId/75398ed9-e3b5-4c11-849e-5d6e17a3bdea/SV\\_1C7RiAvXQKpoa6W?Q\\_CHL=preview&Q\\_SurveyVersionID=current](https://copensocialscience.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/preview/previewId/75398ed9-e3b5-4c11-849e-5d6e17a3bdea/SV_1C7RiAvXQKpoa6W?Q_CHL=preview&Q_SurveyVersionID=current)<sup>1</sup>

**Ethics:** This study was conducted in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and ethical standards of the University of Copenhagen. All survey responses were collected anonymously, ensuring that no personally identifiable information was recorded. Participants were informed about the study's purpose and provided implicit consent by completing the survey. Respondents could provide their emails to receive a reward for participating in the survey, and emails were collected in a separate survey and cannot be linked to actual responses. Respondents were only given truthful information and were provided with sources of this information after completing the survey.

### A.2 Distribution

The survey was launched softly on April 9th, to see whether any malfunctions appeared. The main problem I had to resolve was with the tax slider. I had written custom Javascript code for the slider to add a percentage symbol, which turned out only to work in a Chrome browser on a computer. Respondents on their phones and Safari could not make it work. This issue was resolved after a few days by removing the percentage symbol, whereafter no malfunctions appeared. Further, other items were removed in the interest of keeping the survey short and the attrition rate low. All problems were resolved by April 12th, and the data collection ended April 21st.

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<sup>1</sup>or taken via [https://copensocialscience.fra1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV\\_1C7RiAvXQKpoa6W?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZWQCMTAAR175pKcWa8fHNKECYupvMae1H7ioOG7NCcWP40KpKh3wVAY1YR8E2nuB2U\\_aem\\_AYbr\\_ccK6rzX2xaj\\_QFRXDhfNwNw6A1oGoQzvpCDGy\\_VZKmCSuBWZmap31d1ivz60axtNriPsVj7gQ82h45gqX-x](https://copensocialscience.fra1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1C7RiAvXQKpoa6W?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZWQCMTAAR175pKcWa8fHNKECYupvMae1H7ioOG7NCcWP40KpKh3wVAY1YR8E2nuB2U_aem_AYbr_ccK6rzX2xaj_QFRXDhfNwNw6A1oGoQzvpCDGy_VZKmCSuBWZmap31d1ivz60axtNriPsVj7gQ82h45gqX-x)

### A.3 Redistribution Index Construction

I construct my index using the Performance package in R (Lüdtke et al. 2021). I follow the approach of Larsen 2024 (329-333), and assess the validity of the index on the control condition, to keep attitudes constant. I first see the cross-item correlation, which is near or clearly above the 0.3. The average correlation is 0.38, which is satisfactorily high. I conclude that the measurement validity is high enough.

Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Binary Likert Indices

	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5
L1	1.0000000	0.4694645	0.4171248	0.3966383	0.3736220
L2	0.4694645	1.0000000	0.3946039	0.3439227	0.5079796
L3	0.4171248	0.3946039	1.0000000	0.3702694	0.2970112
L4	0.3966383	0.3439227	0.3702694	1.0000000	0.2839300
L5	0.3736220	0.5079796	0.2970112	0.2839300	1.0000000

In table 2, show the item discrimination, to see how dependent the index is of a given item. The value should be above 0,4, and since they all are, all of the items complement the index well (Larsen 2024: 332). Finally, the Cronbach's alpha has a reliability coefficient of 0.757, which is above the desired level of 0.7 (Larsen 2024: 333). In sum, the index is valid and reliable.


Table 2: Item Discrimination

Item	Discrimination
L1: Inequality is a problem	0.57
L2: More redistribution	0.60
L3: Top tax rates are too high	0.50
L4: More private welfare	0.47
L5: More [kontanthjælp]	0.49

## A.4 Further descriptive results on expectations

Below, I visualize the distribution of expected position by gender, on comparable subsets. The left side shows the difference between genders on the subset of respondents who are on educations with the highest expected average income, where the stark differences in the belief of being part of the top of the income distribution are as pronounced as seen on the full sample. On the right, I only include political science students, who similarly differ in the expectations of being part of the top of the income distribution.

Figure 1: Difference between genders on subsets with comparable characteristics




*Note:* Confidence intervals are set at the 95% level. Only respondents who fully completed the task of distributing the balls.


As seen in the main analysis, differences in preferences for taxation are not clearly present. However, I visualize the differences in the preferred level of progressivity, by taking the ratio between tax levels on different income groups. A value of 1 would indicate that respondents prefer a flat tax. Here, we see that the difference in preferred levels is consistently different who expects to be in the top, who prefer the least progressive tax regime. The group who expect to be part of the third quintile want the most progressive tax regime, while the group expecting to be in the fourth quintile are placed in between.

Figure 2: Preferences for taxation progressivity on each income quintile


Ratio of Q5 to Q1




Ratio of Q5 to Q2



Ratio of Q4 to Q1




Ratio of Q4 to Q2



*Note:* Confidence intervals are set at the 95% level. The higher the ratio is, the less progressive the preference is. The quintiles in the title refer to the ratio of preferred tax level on the given quintile, and not to the ratio of the different groups in the survey.

On figure 2, I visualize differences in the control condition on all five Likert items which measure redistributive preferences. The pattern of consistent similarity between the third and fourth quintile replicates, while the fifth quintiles overlap with the other groups on some items.

Figure 3: Difference by expected group on individual likert items



*Note:* Confidence intervals are set at the 95% level. All items are coded in the anti-redistribution direction.

## A.5 Robustness of main result

As noted in my balance test, the only variable with a slight imbalance was whether or not respondents lived in the capitol region of Denmark (Region Hovedstaden). To ensure that this is not an issue for the main results on taxation, I construct a dichotomous variable for whether respondents live in the capitol region or not, and add it as a control. It has no significant effect on the main model.


Table 3: Main model with control for Capitol Region (Conditional on whether respondents underestimate their future position)

	<i>Dependent variable: Tax Preferences</i>				
	Tax on Q1	Tax on Q2	Tax on Q3	Tax on Q4	Tax on Q5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment (Binary)	0.473 (0.940)	-0.629 (0.762)	-1.498** (0.732)	-2.471*** (0.883)	-2.639** (1.164)
Capitol Region (Binary)	-0.236 (1.302)	-0.439 (1.046)	-0.301 (1.137)	-1.446 (1.284)	-0.265 (1.693)
Observations	501	502	503	503	509
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.002	0.008	0.017	0.010
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.003	-0.002	0.004	0.014	0.006

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.

My main result only includes respondents who underestimate their position. In figure 4, we see the treatment with the full sample included. The estimates are fairly similar to the main result, given the main result includes the two thirds of respondents who underestimate their future income position.

Figure 4: Main Effect of binary treatment on tax preferences (full sample)




Note: Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. n = 780.



On figure 5, I subset the group who holds expectations equal to the treatment. That is, respondents who expect to be in the same income quintile as they receive information. My argument was that this group should be unaffected by the treatment, given that they already expect to have the given level. The results are all significant at the conventional level, but go in a puzzling direction relative to the main estimates. Here, the largest drop is seen at the groups on the bottom, rather than the group at the top. This goes somewhat counter to my main narrative on material self-interest. However, given the insignificance, I hesitate to speculate on why the empirical pattern runs in this direction.

Figure 5: Effect of Binary Treatment on Respondents who hold expectations equal to treatment




Note: Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. Observations: 260.

### A.5.1 Assessing the influence of extreme observations

Due to the continuous nature of the taxation measure, one concern can be that the effect is driven by extreme observations, which bias the average. On figure 6, I visualize the distribution of taxation preferences across the five tax items. As one can see, there are extreme values in the distribution, where some respondents want either a 0% or a 100% tax rate. It is unclear whether one should remove these values. On the one hand, these responses could indicate that respondents responded without the proper attention for the item. On the other hand, these could represent respondents true attitudes, and simply express that the respondent has extreme taxation preferences. To address this concern, I remove respondents who answer either 0 or 100, to assess the robustness of the main model. This is presented on figure 7.


Figure 6: Distribution of Taxation Attitudes



*Note:* Dot size represent the amount of observations. 1 represents the treatment condition, 0 represents the control condition. Observations: 509.

Below, we see the main model run anew, without the extreme values. Here, we actually see that the result becomes more significant than in the original model. My main results are therefore not significantly different by removing extreme observations, and concerns on how influential these few observations are alleviated.

Figure 7: Main estimates excluding extreme values




Note: Confidence intervals are set at the 95% level. Conditional Average Treatment Effect on respondents who underestimate their future position. Observations: 495

## A.6 Treatment assessment

To evaluate to what extent respondents either could recall or where aware of the income information, I asked both the control condition and the treatment what the average future income of graduates with their degree. To start with the control condition, the logic is first to assess whether respondents are aware of the income information, and then how they rate their personal prospects relative to this information. On the right side of 9, we see that respondents across groups believe that they will earn a higher wage than what they believe the average wage to be. As respondents are uninformed, this expresses their guess. On the left side, where I see whether respondents can recall the information, most respondents who recall the wage information correctly also believe that they will earn above average wages.

Figure 8: Income confidence by estimated wage




While interesting descriptively, it is difficult to infer from these estimates whether respondents updated their beliefs about where they would be in the income distribution. Given that this surveys beliefs about absolute income, the bias I describe in section 5.3 to estimate income correctly, but underestimate position, persist. Ex post, it could have been desirable to have an item which more directly measured whether relative beliefs where updated. However, this variable would have been affected by the prior elicitation of where

respondents believed they would be placed in society, and would have presented its own limitations.

## A.7 Distribution of Respondents by Institution and Degree

Below, I visualize the distribution of respondents by educational institutions. As one can see, respondents predominantly study at the University of Copenhagen (Københavns Universitet), and students who study political science (statskundskab) are heavily represented.

Figure 9: Distribution of Institutions



## B Appendix for ISSP (section 6.1)

I include the full regression models which are visualized in section 6.1. The two tables below contain the full estimates, where income is scaled differently from country to country, why it has its own column.

Table 4: Full Logistic Regression Results on Redistribution

	<i>Dependent variable: It is the responsibility of the government to redistribute</i>				
	Denmark	Germany	France	USA	UK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Top	−0.505*** (0.185)	−0.496*** (0.170)	−0.160 (0.216)	0.168 (0.123)	−0.164 (0.182)
Bottom	0.242 (0.222)	0.612*** (0.232)	0.535*** (0.131)	0.705*** (0.152)	0.489*** (0.147)
Income (DK)	−0.00000*** (0.00000)				
Income (DE)		−0.0003*** (0.0001)			
Income (FR)			−0.00003 (0.00002)		
Income (US)				−0.00000 (0.00000)	
Income (GB)					−0.0002*** (0.00004)
Age (continuous)	−0.004 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.015*** (0.004)	−0.022*** (0.003)	−0.011*** (0.004)
Gender (female)	0.464*** (0.150)	0.072 (0.159)	0.090 (0.119)	−0.042 (0.107)	0.082 (0.119)
Education (Years)	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.018)	0.002 (0.009)	0.078*** (0.021)	0.043** (0.019)
Observations	762	1,004	1,318	1,576	1,373

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5: Full Logistic Regression Results on Redistribution

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Denmark	Germany	France	USA	UK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Top	-0.736*** (0.218)	-0.747*** (0.164)	-0.319 (0.228)	-0.095 (0.126)	-0.484** (0.195)
Bottom	0.263 (0.223)	0.109 (0.183)	0.677*** (0.133)	0.541*** (0.163)	0.528*** (0.134)
Income (DK)	-0.00000 (0.00000)				
Income (DE)		-0.0003*** (0.0001)			
Income (FR)			-0.0001** (0.00003)		
Income (US)				-0.00000 (0.00000)	
Income (GB)					-0.0001* (0.00004)
Age (continuous)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.011** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Gender (female)	0.221 (0.162)	-0.351** (0.144)	-0.232* (0.122)	0.135 (0.111)	-0.081 (0.115)
Education (Years)	0.005 (0.013)	0.013 (0.018)	0.007 (0.009)	0.106*** (0.022)	0.055*** (0.018)
Observations	733	965	1,182	1,508	1,349

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C Appendix for DLSY (section 6.2)

### C.1 Coding of educational levels and expectations

To compare expected educational level and realized education, I had to rescale the original formulation from 1968 to encompass the granular scales from 1973 and 1976. The 7th and 8th grade were recoded directly. 9th grade encompassed both the technical and general track (both scaled to 3). The 10 grade also encompassed both the technical and general track (scaled to 4). Lower secondary without an exam was also scaled to 4. Lower secondary education and higher preparatory exam were scaled to 5. Upper secondary education was scaled to 6. Respondents who were attending a given degree were given a half value lower than respondents who had completed the degree. The main variation in educational performance, as also seen on plot 6.4 in the thesis, is that respondents graduate from their degree and hence improve their educational standing.

Code	Grade Expected to Leave School
1	7th grade
2	8th grade
3	9th grade
4	10th grade
5	Lower Secondary Education
6	Upper Secondary Education
8	Other

Table 6: Highest Expected Grade to Leave School in 1968

Code	Education Completed or Attending
1	7th grade
2	8th grade
3	9th grade general
4	Technical preparation exam (9th grade)
5	10th grade general
6	Technical preparation exam (10th grade)
7	Lower secondary without exam
8	Lower secondary with exam
9	Att. lower secondary
10	Att. upper secondary (Gymnasium)
11	Att. upper secondary (single courses)
12	Completed upper secondary education
13	Att. Higher Preparatory Exam
14	Higher Preparatory Exam
15	Other

Table 7: Classification of grades in 1973 and 1976



## C.2 Regression model for panel analysis

The main OLS estimator is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \beta ItE_{it} + \delta \mathbf{x}_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The independent variable is denoted by  $ItE$ , expressing the difference between the expected level of education to how well respondents have fared in the given year (i.e., how much they have improved). Coefficient  $\beta$  denotes the relation with  $y_{it}$  caused by changes in  $ItE$  from the first to the second period. I control for educational expectations to keep them constant, and improvements in educational outcomes is the variable that drives change in the coefficient. This addresses non-linearities due to varying levels on initial expectations, to make the treatment condition comply to the assumption of linear trends (Imai and Kim 2021). This solution is not without limitations, as the experienced educational improvement differs by surpassing one's expectations, meeting them or disappointing them less. Given the limited variation in the independent variable, I am not fully able to distinguish between these three effects.

$y_{it}$  represents the dependent variable, expressing the change in attitudes in individual  $i$  at time  $t$ .  $\delta$  is a vector of control estimates of the control variables described above.  $\alpha_i$  represents individual fixed effects, and  $\gamma_t$  represents time-fixed effects. Note that I only include time-fixed effects in half of the model. Finally,  $\varepsilon_{it}$  represents the error term.

## D Full questionnaire (English)

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### Demographics

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1. Are you currently pursuing higher education in Denmark?

- Yes
- No

2. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other
- Prefer not to disclose

3. How old are you?

- 22 or younger
- 23-26
- 27-30
- 31-34
- 34 or older

4. Which region do you live in?

- North Jutland Region
- Central Jutland Region
- Southern Denmark Region
- Zealand Region
- Capital Region of Denmark

---

### What education are you pursuing?

- Type of Tertiary Education (dropdown)
- Institution (dropdown)
- Degree type at the institution (dropdown)

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### Explanation of Balls in Bins tasks

On the next page, you will be asked to complete a short exercise. Here, you will indicate where you believe you will be in the income distribution in the future.

In the exercise, you will place 20 balls. Each ball represents a 5% probability that you will fall into that income group.

Income distribution refers to where you think you will be in terms of salary compared to other adult Danes.

- I have read the above text - click to continue

---

**Expectations (Balls in Bins)** Imagine you have been in the labor market for 10 years after completing your education. Where do you think you will be in the income distribution? Place all 20 balls by clicking on the categories to show where you think you will end up. If you want to remove a ball, you can click on it.

- Top 20%
- Second highest 20%
- Middle 20%
- Second lowest 20%
- Lowest 20%

---

**Expectations - 5-point scale, if respondent did not distribute all 20 balls**

You did not distribute enough balls to clearly express your expectations.

Imagine again that you have been in the labor market for 10 years after completing your education. Where do you think you will be in the income distribution?

- Top 20%
- Second highest 20%
- Middle 20%
- Second lowest 20%
- Lowest 20%

---

**Political Beliefs**

1. In political matters, people talk about being "left-wing" or "right-wing". What best describes your political stance?

- Left-wing

- Center-left
- Center
- Center-right
- Right-wing

2. Which party did you vote for in the parliamentary election on November 1, 2022?

- A. Social Democrats
- B. Social Liberal Party
- C. Conservative People's Party
- D. New Right
- F. Socialist People's Party
- I. Liberal Alliance
- K. Christian Democrats
- M. The Moderates
- O. Danish People's Party
- Q. Free Greens
- V. Venstre, Denmark's Liberal Party
- Æ. Denmark Democrats - Inger Støjberg
- Ø. Red-Green Alliance
- Å. The Alternative
- Other party/Independent candidate
- Did not vote
- Blank vote
- Did not have the right to vote
- Prefer not to answer
- Don't remember

---

**Treatment** (shown randomly to half of the sample)

You indicated that you are studying [*chosen degree*] at [*chosen institution*]. The income for the average student 10 years after entering the labor market is [*average wage for chosen degree*] kroner per month (before taxes, including pension).

With that income, you will be among the [XX% richest/poorest] in Denmark. This means that [XX% of the population would have a higher/lower income than you].

- I have read the above text - click to continue

**Placebo** (shown randomly to half of the sample)

You indicated that you are studying [*chosen degree*] at [*chosen institution*].

- I have read the above text - click to continue

---

**Outcome brief** You will now be asked a series of questions about Danish conditions.

If there are questions you do not have an opinion on or do not wish to answer, you can move on. Even if some questions are difficult to answer, please provide your best estimate.

---

1. Economic inequality is a big problem in Denmark

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

2. The government should raise taxes and transfers to reduce income disparities between the rich and the poor in Denmark

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

3. The top tax rate is too high in Denmark

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

4. There should be more opportunities to purchase welfare services privately in Denmark

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree

- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

5. The social assistance benefits should be increased in Denmark

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

---

### Meritocracy

1. Is luck or personal effort most important in determining whether one becomes rich or poor in Denmark?

- Luck is most important
- Luck is somewhat more important
- Equal parts luck and effort
- Personal effort is somewhat more important
- Personal effort is most important

---

### Economic efficiency vs. equality

In political decisions, one often has to balance between growth and equality. Which is more important to you?

Choose on the scale where '1' is economic equality, and '10' is economic growth.

- 1: Economic equality is most important
- (Option 2 to 9)
- 10: Economic growth is most important

---

### Tax Rates: Slider

If you could freely determine, how much do you think different income groups should pay in taxes? Drag the slider to show where you think the tax rate should be.

- Top 20% income (Tax rate set on slider from 0 to 100%)
- Second highest 20% income (Tax rate set on slider from 0 to 100%)

- Middle 20% income (Tax rate set on slider from 0 to 100%)
  - Second lowest 20% income (Tax rate set on slider from 0 to 100%)
  - Lowest 20% income (Tax rate set on slider from 0 to 100%)
- 

### Treatment Check

Earlier in this survey, you were informed about what the average student [*chosen degree*] at [*chosen institution*] earns per month 10 years after entering the labor market (before taxes, including pension).

Do you remember what one could approximately expect to earn? Indicate the figure that is closest to what you remember.

- 10,000 DKK
- 20,000 DKK
- 30,000 DKK
- 40,000 DKK
- 50,000 DKK
- 60,000 DKK
- 70,000 DKK
- 80,000 DKK
- 90,000 DKK
- 100,000 DKK or more per month

You indicated that the average student from [*chosen degree*] at [*chosen institution*] earns about [*answer selected above*] per month 10 years after entering the labor market. Do you think that you will earn:

- Much more than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Slightly more than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- About [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Slightly less than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Much less than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Don't know

After 10 years in the labor market, do you think you will work in the private or public sector?

- I will definitely work in the private sector

- I will probably work in the private sector
- There is an equal chance that I will work in the private or public sector
- I will probably work in the public sector
- I will definitely work in the public sector

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**Placebo Check** At the beginning of this survey, you were asked to indicate your best estimate of where you will be in the income distribution in 10 years. Here at the end, there are some follow-up questions about your income prospects.

Give your best estimate of what the average student from [*chosen education*] at [*chosen institution*] earns per month after 10 years (before taxes, including pension):

- 10,000 DKK
- 20,000 DKK
- 30,000 DKK
- 40,000 DKK
- 50,000 DKK
- 60,000 DKK
- 70,000 DKK
- 80,000 DKK
- 90,000 DKK
- 100,000 DKK or more per month

You indicated that the average student from [*chosen degree*] at [*chosen institution*] earns about [*answer selected above*] per month 10 years after entering the labor market. Do you think that you will earn:

- Much more than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Slightly more than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- About [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Slightly less than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Much less than [*selected answer*] per month (before taxes, including pension)
- Don't know

After 10 years in the labor market, do you think you will work in the private or public sector?

- I will definitely work in the private sector



- I will probably work in the private sector
- There is an equal chance that I will work in the private or public sector
- I will probably work in the public sector
- I will definitely work in the public sector

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**Thank you for your participation!**

Thank you very much for participating in my survey! I greatly appreciate it. The information you have been shown in this survey about education and income is based on data from Statistics Denmark, the Economic Council of the Labour Movement, and Uddannelseszoom.dk.

If you are interested in a guide to applying for scholarships, writing the methodology section, or applying for a PhD in the USA, you will be taken to a page where you can anonymously provide your email after choosing an option. The guides will be sent out when the data collection is complete, which will be around April 25.

Thanks again for your participation - and send an email to kbz724@ifs.ku.dk if you have any comments or questions!

- Scholarship guide
- How to apply for a PhD in the USA
- How to write your methodology section
- Nothing needed - questionnaire completed out of interest

## References

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